Preface
The way in which wars are fought seems to be changing fundamentally at present. In addition to the confirmation of many old principles that we have to relearn through the focus on operations within the framework of international crisis management, we can derive trends from observations of current conflicts that will probably have a strong impact on warfare beyond 2030.
These include:
reorientation of Western armies towards large-scale military operations of high intensity,
scarce availability of the resource “personnel” in terms of quantity and quality,
strong increase in the density of sensors, especially through unmanned systems on the battlefield, which leads to the so-called “transparent battlefield”,
digital “revolution” on the battlefield with the consequence of having to control and process ever larger amounts of data,
compelling need to generate superiority in information, leadership and effectiveness through speed,
current dominance of the “fire” factor over the “movement” factor and
increasing reconnaissance and offensive capabilities, even of “second-class” opponents.
For Western armed forces, which have been largely certain of their superiority over potential opponents since the early 1990s, this leads to a number of challenges. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, there is pressure to act, to save time and to innovate in order not to be outdone by the enemy (“peer adversary”).
This is particularly true for the German Armed Forces. Even if the current security situation in Europe is similar to the situation in the 1980s, the German Armed Forces will have to take new paths in many areas in order to meet future challenges on the battlefield. A crucial capability for this is the provision of the most dense, seamless digital situation picture possible as a prerequisite for the ability to conduct reconnaissance based on a wide range of sensors and to engage targets with a wide range of weapons in almost real time.
In order to ensure this, sensors and effectors must be effectively digitally networked. This is how the superior effectiveness mentioned is achieved.
Definition and derivation of the S2E
The provisional definition of the working term is as follows:
The reconnaissance and effects network, also known as the Aufklärungs-und Wirkverbund (AWV), describes the robust, agile, automated, effective and seamless networking of all Land forces sensors, via a coordination and control instance with all Land forces effectors (indirect/direct and lethal/non-lethal), in order to achieve effects on the entire battlefield from rear to close to deep faster than the enemy with the available and most suitable means of action and thus make a significant contribution to the ability to win. In the target state, it goes far beyond optimizing the cooperation between reconnaissance and artillery and is therefore a joint task for the armed forces. Information and command superiority leads to effectiveness superiority!”
In principle, the principle is not revolutionary and is derived from the principle of the “Sensor-to-Shooter-Link”, which the German Armed Forces artillery troops have been using successfully since the 1990s, and in which the sensors and effectors in the command and weapon deployment system “FührungsWaffenEinsatzSystem (FüWES) ADLER are networked with each other. What is new, however, is the approach of integrating not just one branch of the military, but gradually the entire Land forces into the S2E and thus establishing the ability to connect to Multi Domain Operations (MDO). This will of course not be achieved immediately, but is planned to be done gradually:
Step 1: Initial S2E capability for the army reconnaissance and artillery troops,
Step 2: Intermediate capability of the entire German Armed Forces,
Step 3: Target capability of the Land Forces (German) with simultaneous multinational integration, especially of our NLD partners.
The challenge here is to digitally integrate the various current and planned individual systems into a common core system and to quickly process the expected flood of data in order to quickly achieve effects on the entire battlefield from rear to close to deep. A central Battlefield Management System (BMS) as a core system, which integrates the various existing digital systems as peripheral systems, appears to be the most practical solution here. The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) functions is also essential for efficient work in view of the expected volume of data.
Areas of application can include:
automated system recognition (aerial image, sensor data, etc.) and their tactical assignment,
filtering, display, rapid evaluation and assignment of reconnaissance results,
(partially) automated creation of target reports with pre-prioritization,
creation of decision proposals in the combat process,
automated management and cleaning of situation maps,
calculation of expected impact and collateral effects for risk analysis and
automated impact analysis to avoid report-related filing.
The aim of using AI is to relieve military command personnel of time-consuming and repetitive peripheral tasks so that they can concentrate on the tactical events on the battlefield and make decisions appropriate to the situation. As far as we understand, decisions are still made by humans! However, it should be borne in mind that in the future we may be confronted with an enemy who, in order to increase efficiency, leaves the decision to AI and thus generates speed. In addition to these more technically focused starting points, there is also a need for a common basic understanding of how, who and with what effects should be created on the battlefield in the future in order to be able to maintain the coherence of combat operations. A simple “more is better” alone without appropriate coordination will probably not achieve the desired effect.
Evaluation of the sensor components
The German Army is currently facing a generational change and a comprehensive expansion of sensor equipment across all branches of the military. The introduction of new equipment is planned for the classic reconnaissance systems, including:
the new generation reconnaissance vehicle (Recce Vehicle NG) as a replacement for the FENNEK reconnaissance vehicle for the Recce Troops,
new equipment for the Joint Fire Support Teams (JFST), dismounted and heavy,
renewal or performance improvement of the radar equipment for the Recce- and ArtyTroops,
generational change (HUSAR) for medium-range unmanned reconnaissance systems (UAS) for the Recce – and ArtyTroops.
Also new is the intended deployment of a large number of small and micro UAS for a wide variety of purposes in all Army units. Technical integration is a particular challenge here, as the systems must be inexpensive on the one hand, but at the same time at least partially integrable into the system on the other. The increased range of the effectors, which will be discussed below, also means that the reconnaissance depth of the sensors has to be increased. Since the sensors already described are reaching technical and physical limits when it comes to implementation, the area of target and effect reconnaissance must be considered in more depth in the future. Cross-organizational and cross-dimensional capabilities, such as satellite reconnaissance, JISR and intelligence
Consideration of the command and control structure
The core element of the S2E network is a technically and organizationally efficient command structure that seamlessly networks and synchronizes the many individual components. Swivel chair interfaces must be avoided in the future. Due to the expanded capabilities of potential opponents, command posts and communication nodes are to a large extent the focus of the enemy S2E network as high-value targets. If they are eliminated, the enemy can temporarily significantly reduce the efficiency of its own weapons effect or even permanently suppress it with comparatively little effort. In order to ensure the efficiency, resilience and survivability of the S2E network, the following technical requirements for the command structure must be met:
powerful Battlefield Management System (BMS) as the core system,
interfaces for seamless connection of existing systems and future applications,
possibility of regular hardware regeneration and adaptation of modern AI applications,
long radio ranges for connecting the sub-command posts deployed in depth,
interference resistance and compensation options in the event of failure of subcomponents and
synchronization with the introduction of a new generation of radio devices in the German Armed Forces.
In organizational terms, the command structure must also adapt to the changed threat situation. The comparatively large and cumbersome main command posts will tend to have to be located much further to the rear. This means that they are less exposed to direct reconnaissance and effects of the enemy. The forward command posts and command elements are small, highly mobile and should be planned as protected wherever possible in order to be difficult to reconnaissance and not to present a target. Overall, the command post organization must examine which cells and headquarters can be merged in order to avoid redundant information strands and decision-making responsibilities. Personnel reserves gained in this way can, for example, be invested in the representation of shift capability.
Evaluation of the effectors
In parallel with the expansion of the range of sensors, the range of weapons is also being expanded. In the artillery troops, the MARS II rocket launcher will in future be replaced by the future long-range indirect fire system (ZukSysIndF gRw), with the target system being the rocket launcher PULS. This will be used in the future by the division and corps artillery units. In the future, it will have a range of over 300 kilometers with correspondingly long-range ammunition. The PzH 2000 will remain as the brigade artillery tube artillery system in the armored artillery battalions of the heavy brigades and will in future ensure fire support with known and new types of ammunition up to a range of 70 kilometers. The artillery battalions of the medium forces and the tube artillery components of the division artillery will in future be equipped with the Remote Controlled Howitzer (RCH) 155mm, which has the same range as the PzH 2000. The RCH155mm will have a crew of two soldiers in the future. Until the wheeled systems arrive, planned from 2028, the PzH 2000 will be used as a substitute in the ArtyBn Medium Forces. It will thus make a substantial contribution to the growth of the new capabilities of the Medium Force Brigade category.
While the RCH 155mm is already designed for use with the FüWES ADLER during the development process and can therefore be integrated into the future S2E network without delay, the digital integration of the PULS rocket launcher has yet to take place.
In the medium and long term, the concept is to enable the artillery to use Loitering Munition Systems (LMS). The Medium Forces ArtyBn should be able to use this effectively to attack moving, even armored, targets up to a depth of 70 kilometers. Firing and use should take place from special launcher systems and ground control stations. In the future, the PULS rocket launcher will also be qualified to fire special LMS as a “secondary role capability”.
In addition to the classic combat troops’ effective means, LMS of various sizes and ranges will also be used here at unit and association level. This represents a significant expansion of the German Army’s effective means range. These effectors also need to be integrated into the S2E network in order to be able to form flexible fire focal points. For the first time, strong armored enemies can be effectively worn down or even destroyed before entering the duel situation on the approach or during deployment. However, such a concentrated approach can only be coordinated by a powerful S2E network.
Summary and Outlook
The German Army as a whole is facing a radical restructuring. For the first time in decades, there is an increase in structure and capabilities. This means a significant increase for the artillery troops. With the establishment of the ArtyBn 455 of the Armored Brigade 45 LTU, the German Army will in future have 10 artillery battalions at all tactical command levels. In addition to the brigade level, the Recce Troops will again set up units for division and corps troops. This means that the troop commander will once again have adapted reconnaissance and operational resources at his disposal for all levels of tactical command. Due to the limited availability of key resources “personnel”, the maximum firepower and effectiveness must be extracted from the planned structures. Without solid material equipment and technical support for the soldiers through (partially) automated processes in the overall S2E system, the variety of tasks to be mastered will clearly overtax the soldiers in combat and lead to a lack of stamina. The establishment of an S2E network for the German Army and the
Land Forces is therefore the focus of the Army Command for three reasons:
Increasing the effectiveness superiority over potential opponents,
Relieving the soldiers in combat and concentrating on the core mission and
Integrating new systems and capabilities to increase combat capability.
In view of the dynamic nature of technical innovations, including and especially among our potential opponents, Mikhail Gorbachev’s saying from the time shortly before German reunification still applies: “Those who come too late are punished by life!”
Therefore, ACCDC III 2 ArtyTr/JFS was commissioned by the Chief of ACCDC to investigate, as a first step, possibilities for improving the S2E network in conjunction with ACCDC II 1 Recce Troops. To this end, in 2024, with the broad involvement of experts from the Army HQ, ACCDC, the generals of the artillery and Recce Troops, the major units, from MN partners (especially the NLD) to the Ministry of defense, three areas will be examined in more detail:
Technology
Organization
Processes
The first workshop to investigate technical improvement options was already held from March 20-21, 2024. It gave a good insight into possible improvements, e.g. by creating a BMS interface with ADLER and possible integration of sensors and effectors from the Armored Troops- and Army Aviation Troops, which will be further investigated in the future. The BMS-ADLER interface is to be tested together with the Recce Troops during the ACCDC land experimental series in the Army Combat Training Center (GefÜbZ HEER) in October. In addition, rolling out ADLER via tablet to the sub-units of the Recce Troops also appears to be a possible starting point as an interim solution, as long as automated interfaces do not yet exist. Aside from the absolutely necessary technical adjustments, the adjustment of processes with clear definition of responsibilities in particular seems to offer great potential for strengthening the S2E. Everything that does not have to be laboriously coordinated or “deconflicted” in the event of war, but can be regulated in advance and during the course of operational planning, ultimately helps to be able to act faster than the enemy.
The beginning has been made, the starting points have been identified and even if in some cases “the devil is in the detail”, we are optimistic that we will soon see the first noticeable and measurable improvements.
OF-4 M. Sedelies`
DEU XO DECJFS
